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CIVIL RICO UNDER FIRE: WILL WHITE
COLLAR CRIMINALS BE EXEMPTED?
MARK P. COHEN*

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 3, 1985, representatives of a coalition of over twenty
public interest and consumer groups' marched in front of the Washington, D.C. law offices of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering 2 holding aloft a banner reading "Corporate Criminals Must Pay" and chanting "Put your
clients away, let RICO stay." Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering was singled
out as the spearhead of the business lobby seeking, in the coalition's view,
to vitiate the effective civil provisions of the "Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act" ("RICO"), 3 in particular, its treble damage
remedy. The goal of RICO, set out in the "Statement of Findings and
Purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, is "to seek the
eradication of organized crime by strengthening the legal tools in the
evidence gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and
by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the un* J.D., 1985, Antioch School of Law; M.L.S., 1982, Antioch School of Law; B.A., 1974, University of Pittsburgh. Mr. Cohen is the Managing Editor of the RICO Law Reporter. He is a member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and Pennsylvania and is currently a candidate for a
L.L.M. degree in International and Comparative law at the Georgetown University Law Center.
The author wishes to thank the editors of the Antioch Law Journalfor their invaluable assistance in
researching portions of this article. In particular, thanks are due to Frederica Miller, Jim Bride,
Janet Bossart, Dawn Miller, Adam Palmer, Anil Singh and Sue Wagner.
The "Citizens Coalition to Support and Defend RICO" includes the following organizations:
Americans for Democratic Action, Bank Watch, Center for Public Interest Law, Christic Institute,
Citizen's Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes, Consumer Federation of America, Environmental
Action, Environmental Policy Institute, Equal Justice Foundation, Farmworkers Justice Fund, Government Accountability Project, Gray Panthers, Motor Voters, National Citizens Coalition for
Nursing Home Reform, National Council of Senior Citizens, National Organization for Women,
National Insurance Consumer Organization, Pension Rights Center, Public Citizen, Rural Coalition, United States Public Interest Research Group (USPIRG), and Veterans Education Project.
Specially active and effective are Priscilla Budeiri of Public Citizen and Pamela Gilbert of USPIRG.
2 Two partners in Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Arthur F. Mathews and Andrew B. Weissman,
served respectively as Chairman and Executive Director of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of
the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law which proposed a wide range of reforms to limit the reach of civil RICO. Nevertheless, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering has not played an
especially prominent role in lobbying on Capitol Hill to weaken civil RICO and, in fact, Mssrs.
Mathews and Weissman oppose the major legislative initiative of business groups, the "prior conviction" requirement.
3 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982), was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). RICO provides for both criminal penalties, § 1963,
and civil sanctions, § 1964. The civil provisions are currently the more controversial.
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lawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." 4
The civil RICO controversy has generated numerous hearings in the
House and Senate since 1984 and, at last count, five proposed amendments to RICO. Seldom has politics created such unlikely bedfellows.
Arrayed against civil RICO are major industry and trade associations
and several labor unions. RICO's key defenders, on the other hand, include Nader-mold public interest groups and law-and-order-minded state
and local prosecutors. The clash over civil RICO prompted the National
Law Journal to describe the statute as "the most controversial law of the
last quarter century.... "95
Anti-RICO lobbyists complain that civil RICO is leaving the Mafia
unscarred while it is having a ruinous effect on "legitimate business."
They charge that RICO stigmatizes "respectable businessmen" as "racketeers," extorts unfair settlements by threatening innocent defendants
with treble damage exposure, and imports into federal court what would
otherwise be common state court tort actions. Because of RICO's broad
language and liberal interpretation by the Supreme Court, critics predict
a flood of RICO suits based on "garden-variety fraud" absent a legisla6
tive remedy.
The "antis" seek legislative limitations to civil RICO, most notably,
a requirement that before a civil RICO suit may even be filed, the defend7
ant must first be convicted of a criminal offense prohibited by RICO.
The "antis" argue that this "prior conviction requirement" will re-focus
the statute on its intended target, organized crime families, and leave
"legitimate" businesses alone. Yet even the corporate-minded RICO
specialists at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering acknowledge that a "prior conviction requirement" "would so greatly eviscerate the private civil RICO
remedy that it would preclude the statute's use in situations where 'private attorneys-general' can be held to achieve Congress' original objec4 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 923 (1970); see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589

(1981).
5 National Law Journal, August 13, 1984 at p. 1.

6 The Wall Street Journal has raised the spectre that as many as ten percent of the civil cases
filed in federal court in 1986 will include a civil RICO claim. Review Outlook-"The RICO
Racket," Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1986, at 24, col. 1.
At a conference on civil RICO sponsored by the Federal Bar Association held on June 13, 1986
in Washington, D.C., Roger E. Middleton, speaking on behalf of the United States Chamber of
Commerce asserted, without providing proof, that a recent survey of Chamber members indicated
that 95 percent of the lawsuits pending against the Chamber include RICO claims.
More believable is a survey of members of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)
published in May 1986 showing that 33 of 120 companies responding had been sued under RICO a
total of 164 times. The NAM survey had been mailed to the chief legal officers of 683 companies
nationwide.
7 See discussion of H.R. 2943, infra at 174.
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tives" in enacting RICO."
The "pro" side acknowledges that RICO was intended by Congress
primarily to reach traditional organized crime families. It notes, however, that Congress recognized that RICO would reach beyond Mob
families and that it proscribes specific criminal conduct, not membership
in particular organizations. 9 The "pros" assert that if "legitimate" businessmen act like "racketeers," they should be treated as such. They argue that business fraud has become a national blight, perhaps even more
injurious to the economy and social fabric than Mob activity.' 0 The
''pros" therefore oppose any amendments which would discourage
RICO's enforcement by private attorneys general.
II. RICO's PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
Section 1962 establishes what constitutes a RICO violation.', It
prohibits a "person" from investing in, acquiring or maintaining an inter8 Mathews & Weissman, "Opinion," 3 RICO L. Rptr. 1 (January 1986).

9 Criminalizing mere membership in an organization, even an organized crime family, is violative of the First Amendment. Acts, not status, give rise to criminal sanctions.
10 Forbes magazine, the self-described "capitalist tool," recently asserted that "the U.S. is in the
grip of the most devastating epidemic of investment swindles and near swindles in its history."
Forbes, May 20, 1985, at 36.
Section 1962(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section
2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in or the activities which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for
purposes or investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the
control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this
subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his
immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity of
the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate
to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in
law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.

Section 1962(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest
in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
Section 1962(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
Section 1962(d) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
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est in, or conducting or participating in the conduct of the affairs of an
"enterprise" through a "pattern of racketeering," or conspiring to do so.
A "person" "includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal
or beneficial interest in property."' 2 An "enterprise" "includes any individual, partnership, corporation or association, or other legal entity, and
any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity." 1 3 (The association-in-fact enterprise was intended by Congress
to reach wholly criminal organizations but can consist of natural persons
and/or a grouping of other enumerated legal "enterprises.") "Racketeering activity" (also known as "predicate acts") includes a long list of
crimes indictable under federal law or chargeable under state law and
punishable. 14 Notably, this list of predicate acts includes not only crimes
typical of mobsters, such as arson, murder, gambling and drug offenses,
but also mail fraud, wire fraud and securities fraud. A "pattern of racketeering" "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity ....
" (Empha5
sis added.)'
The "pattern" element focuses the statute on repeat
12 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3).

13 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
14 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) defines "racketeering activity as meaning:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery,
extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs,
which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than
one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title
18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports
bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to
theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under 659 is felonious, section 664
(relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating
to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to transmission of gambling
information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud),
sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of
justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511
(relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to
interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the
prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), section 2320 (relating to trafficking in certain
motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in
contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act
which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case
under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation,
receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States, or (E) any act which is
indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act.
15 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) states that a "pattern of racketeering":

requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effec-
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offenders; the "enterprise" element focuses it on criminal activity in connection with, or in the infiltration of, organizations.
Section 1964(c), RICO's private right of action, provides that:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 . . . may sue therefor in any appropriate

United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fees.
Section 1964(c) is by far the most controversial section of the RICO
statute. Particularly troublesome to the "antis" are its provisions for
(1) mandatory treble damages and attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff
and (2) a federal forum, even though the underlying violations would
otherwise be adjudicated in state courts (or not be civilly actionable at
all).
The "antis" charge that plaintiffs have put this organized crime control statute to a number of unintended and frivolous uses, including suits
by an estranged marital partner against her former husband; 1 6 a Hassidic
rabbinical faction contending for control of a congregation; 17and a range
of common law fraud and breach of contract actions recast as treble
damage racketeering claims.
The "pros," however, point to other RICO actions in which plaintiffs are seeking to vindicate the public interest, including: the new Philippine government's suit for a trebled sum of $1.5 billion against deposed
President Ferdinand Marcos and associates for theft of property in the
U.S. belonging to the Philippine people;18 a female carpenter who alleges
that union officers committed acts of extortion and sexual harassment
against her;1 9 a class of poor, uneducated homeowners who alleged that a
savings and loan association and a home improvement contractor fraudulently conspired to force them into foreclosure; 20 residents of a retirement community who alleged that self-dealing by the management of the
community endangered their "life-care" contract; 2 1 an abortion clinic
which alleges it was victimized by a pattern of criminal acts, including
tive date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any
period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.
16Erlbaum v. Erlbaum, [1982 Transfer binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,772 (E.D. Pa. July
31, 1982).
17 Congregation Beth Yitzhok v. Briskman, 566 F. Supp. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
18 Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, C86-0037E (S.D. Tex. filed March 20, 1986).
19 Hunt v. Weatherbee, No. 84-3001-Y (D. Mass., January 23, 1986).
20 Gregory v. Atlantic Permanent Federal Savings and Loan Association, No. 84-620-N (E.D.
Va. settled July 16, 1985).
21 Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982) (claim against Prudential Insurance Company
was recently settled for $62.8 million).
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robbery, extortion and violence committed by anti-abortion activists; 22 a

class of Vietnam veterans who allege that they were defrauded by mobilehome dealers, manufacturers and financing firms in the sale of mobile
homes; 23 a class of employees of a St. Louis daily newspaper who allege

that their pay checks "bounced" because of the "looting" of the company
by the publishers for their personal benefits; 24 a class of steelworkers who
claim they were defrauded out of pay benefits due them when their employer shutdown their plant;25 and a homeowners association which al-

leges that the developer fraudulently misrepresented that it would
maintain the development roads and sewer system. 26
Just how wide a net Congress was attempting to cast with RICO is a
matter of considerable controversy. RICO critics argue that the treble
damages private right of action was an afterthought that Congress, especially the Senate, never adequately considered. 27 Although earlier crime
bills pending before the Senate had provided for a treble damages private
civil remedy, 28 the bill adopted by the Senate, S.30, limited civil relief to
injunctive actions by the United States. By contrast, during House Judiciary Committee hearings on S.30, Representative Steiger proposed inclusion of a private treble damages remedy modeled after the antitrust
laws to "enhance the effectiveness of title IX's prohibitions. ' 29 Three
members of the House Committee dissented, fearing that RICO might be
used to harass business competitors. 30 Nevertheless, the Committee approved the Steiger amendment. 3' The full House considered several proposed amendments to S.30, adopting the amendment proposed by Rep.
Steiger 32 while rejecting one which provided treble damages to defendants injured by malicious RICO suits. 33 The resulting bill was RICO. It

included mail, wire and securities fraud among the predicate acts, expressly contemplating that crime typical of "legitimate business" would
22 Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, No. 85-4845 (E.D. Pa., October 25, 1985).

23 Vietnam Veterans of Americas, Inc. v. Guerdon Industries, Inc., No. 85-244 (MMS) (D.
Del.).
24 Madden v. Gluck, No. 85-2703-C-6 (E.D. Mo. filed Nov. 14, 1985).
25 Lumpkin v. Int'l Harvester Co., No. 81 C 6674 (N.D. Il1. Feb. 10, 1986) (allowing amend-

ment to include RICO claim).
26 Terre Du Lac Association, Inc. v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., No. 84-22962, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 577
(8th Cir. 1985).
27 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 482, 1 RICO L. Rptr. No. 2, Appendix A at

5-8.
28 S. 1623, § 4(a), 91st Cong., 1st Sess., (1969); S. 2048, S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).

29 Hearings on S. 30 and related proposals before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 520 (1970).
30 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., - U.S. -, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 68, 72 (1985).
31 H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, 91 Cong., 2nd Sess. pp. 58, 187 (1970).
32 116 Cong. Rec. 35363-35364 (1970).
33 Id. at 35342.
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fall within the net. Congress further spread the net by providing that
'3 4
RICO "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.
With the enthusiastic endorsement of Senator John McClellan, the sponsor of S.

30,3 1

the Senate adopted the House bill as amended without

seeking conference. 3 6 Thus, although the legislative history is somewhat
unclear, Congress intended a broad construction of RICO.
III. THE SEDIMA DECISION
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc. ,37 and its companion case,
American National Bank & Trust Company of Chicago v. Haroco,38 are
the only civil RICO actions yet to have been considered by the Supreme
Court.
Sedima concerned a joint business venture between two companies,
Sedima and Imrex, to provide electronic components to a Belgian firm.
Sedima accused Imrex of submitting inflated invoices, thereby cheating
Sedima out of its fair share of the joint venture proceeds. Sedima sued
Imrex and two of its officers under a number of theories, including
§ 1962(c) of RICO, which prohibits a "person" from associating with an
"enterprise" through a pattern of racketeering. In affirming the district
court's dismissal of the RICO claim, a divided panel of the Second Circuit held that absent defendant's prior conviction for a predicate act or
criminal RICO, no civil RICO action could lie. In addition, the Second
Circuit ruled that to state a civil RICO claim a plaintiff must allege more
than simply injuries flowing from the individual predicate criminal violations; rather, a distinct injury must result from the pattern of racketeering. 39 Underlying the Second Circuit's decision was a thinly veiled

hostility toward RICO common among judgesA° Judge Oakes wrote for
the majority that:
Section 1964(c) has not proved particularly useful for generating
treble damage actions against mobsters by victimized businesspeople. It has, instead, led to claims against such respected and
legitimate "enterprises" as the American Express Company, E.F.
Hutton & Co., Lloyd's of London, Bear Steams & Co., and Mer34 Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970).
35 Supra, note 34 at 25190.
36 Supra note 34 at 36296.
37 - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 68 (1985).
38 U.S. -, No. 84-822, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 95 (1985).
39 741 F.2d 482, 1 RICO L. Rptr. No. 2, Appendix A (2d Cir. 1984).
40 Jed. S. Rakoff, a partner in the New York law firm of Mudge, Rose, Guthrie and Alexander,
speaking on the topic, "Defending Civil RICO Actions," at a conference on civil RICO in Washington, D.C. on June 19, 1986, recommended that defense counsel engage in extensive motions practice
in civil RICO actions because courts are ordinarily searching for an excuse to dismiss civil RICO
claims.
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The Supreme Court majority agreed with Judge Oakes that "RICO
is evolving into something quite different from the original conception of
42
its enactors" and hinted that Congress might wish to revisit the statute.
Nevertheless, the Court rejected the two standing limitations on civil
RICO invoked by the Second Circuit-the prior criminal conviction and
the distinct racketeering-type injury-as unsupported by either the language or the legislative history of the statute.
At oral argument Justice Marshall had expressed irritation with
civil RICO's breadth, asking counsel for Sedima if he was "familiar with
the list of respected businesses cited by Judge Oakes . . . which were

subject to RICO suits."' 43 In his dissent in Sedima, joined by Justices
Brennan, Blackmun and Powell, Marshall expressed alarm that "[t]he
Court's interpretation of the civil RICO statute quite simply revolutionizes private litigation .... ,44 He noted that a study conducted by the Ad
Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business law found that only 9 percent of the reported civil
RICO cases involved allegations of criminal activity typical of organized
crime families, whereas 40 percent of the cases involved allegations of
securities fraud, and another 37 percent involved common law business
or commercial fraud. According to Justice Marshall, RICO creates a
private right of action for mail fraud and wire fraud where none previously existed; it displaces carefully crafted standing requirements under
securities, commodities and antitrust law; it federalizes common law tort
actions; and it subjects legitimate businessmen to the pejorative label of
"racketeer" and treble damage liability. Justice Powell, in a separate
dissent, warned of a flood of litigation in federal courts as plaintiffs discover that what they once thought of as simple breach of contract and
fraud actions were henceforth treble damage civil racketeering cases.
Both Justice Marshall and Justice Powell supported a special "racketeer41 1 RICO L. Rptr. at A-4. In fact the Second Circuit's selection of "respected and legitimate"
businesses purportedly victimized by RICO might better have been chosen by proponents of the
statute. One of the Second Circuit's "respected" businesses, American Express, was accused in 1979
by Citicorp, in full-page newspaper ads, of false and deceptive advertising about the relative merits of
the two companies' travelers checks. Everybody's Business 483 (M. Moscowitz, M. Katz & R. Levering 1980). Another one of the Second Circuit's "legitimate" businesses, Merrill Lynch, was fined
$1.6 million in 1977 for disseminating "false and misleading" reports to approximately 4,000 customers about Scientific Control, a Texas computer company which had gone bankrupt in 1969.
Everybody's Business, at 489.
42 Sedima, supra at 78.
43 See I RICO L. Rptr. 917 (May 1985).
44 Sedima, supra at 79.
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ing injury" requirement; both were conspicuously silent about the Second Circuit's prior conviction requirement.
Justice White, writing for the majority, did not share the dissenters'
and Judge Oakes' incredulity that the RICO net caught white collar
criminals:
Underlying the Court of Appeals' holding was its distress at the
"extraordinary, if not outrageous," uses to which civil RICO has
been put. Instead of being used against mobsters and organized
criminals, it has become a tool for everyday fraud cases brought
against "respected and legitimate 'enterprises.' " Yet Congress
wanted to reach both "legitimate" and "illegitimate" enterprises.
[quoting United States v. Turkette, 453 U.S. 576 (1981).] The former enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor
immunity from its consequences. The fact that § 1964(c) is used
against respected businesses allegedly engaged in a pattern of specifically identified criminal conduct is hardly a sufficient reason for
assuming that the provision is being misconstrued. Nor does it
reveal the "ambiguity" discovered by the court below. "[T]he fact
that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated
by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. it demonstrates
breadth."

'4 5

IV. CIVIL RICO LITIGATION AFTER SEDIMA
Although the Supreme Court has stamped its imprimature on a
broad construction of civil RICO, defendants are not helpless in the postSedima era. A talented "RICO bar" has fashioned a number of defenses
which often receive a warm reception from a generally RICO-hostile judiciary. That only a handful of judgments actually has been awarded
46
RICO plaintiffs to date suggests the effectiveness of these defenses.
The Supreme Court's "pattern" dicta in Sedima footnote 14, in particular, has emerged as an effective limitation on civil RICO actions.
Prior to Sedima most of the case law interpreting the "pattern of racketeering" requirement had developed in criminal prosecutions. The criminal precedent typically held that two related racketeering acts in a ten
45 Id. at 78 (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d
384, 398).
46 Among the few RICO cases which have gone to judgment are: B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 2 RICO L. Rptr. 453, (D.N.J. 1985); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Ill. v. Levy, 2 RICO
L. Rptr. 598 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Commonwealth of Pa. v. Cianfrani, 1 RICO L. Rptr. 974 (E.D. Pa.
1985); Horn v. Dittmer, No. 81-5154 (W.D. Ark. 1984), reversed sub nom, Norn v. Ray E. Friedman
& Co., 3 RICO L. Rptr. 82 (8th Cir. 1985); Armco Industrial Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co.,
No. 3-82-1271-H (N.D. Tex. 1984), reversed, 3 RICO L. Rptr. 547 (5th Cir. 1986); Donovan v.
Goldstein, C.A. Nos. 83-0940, 83-0780 (D.D.C. 1984); Callan v. State Chemical Manufacturing Co.,
Civ. A. No. 83-4317 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
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year period satisfied the "pattern" requirement. 4 7 The Sedima Court
noted, however, that the statutory language requires "at least two acts of
racketeering activity"; 48 thus two acts are necessary but may not be sufficient to satisfy the "pattern" requirement. (Emphasis added.) The
Court suggested that a "pattern" connotes some relationship between the
acts and their repetition or threat of repetition. It referred to a Senate
Report which stated that RICO was not intended to reach "sporadic activity": "the infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more
than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing activity to be
effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationshipwhich combines
49
to produce a pattern." (Emphasis added by Supreme Court.)
The Sedima "pattern" dicta has been interpreted in a variety of
ways by lower courts. A few have virtually ignored it;5° some say that
the predicate acts simply must be related to one another; 51 others require
some continuity and relationship among the acts; 52 another says the
predicate acts need only be related to the "enterprise", not to each
other; 53 others require multiple criminal transactions or episodes, not
simply a multiplicity of predicate acts; 54 and yet others require multiple
fraudulent schemes. 55 The clear trend is that separate episodes or
schemes are required. As a leading RICO practitioner/commentator has
47 United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1474-75 (11th Cir. 1985) (two related acts are
sufficient); United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1121-23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871
(1980) (two acts related to the enterprise are sufficient); but see, United States v. Stofsky, 409 F.
Supp. 609, 612-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819
(1976) ("pattern" connotes "some common scheme, plan or motive ... and not simply a series of
disconnected acts"; United States v. Computer Sciences Corporation, 689 F.2d 1181, 1189-90 (4th
Cir. 1982) (dicta questioning whether multiple offenses in a single criminal episode could constitute a
pattern).
48 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
49 S. Rep. No. 91-617, 91 Cong. 2nd Sess., p. 158 (1969).
50 Illinois Dept. of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 434 (7th Cir. August 27,
1985); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Ill. v. Levy, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 598 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
51 R.A.G.S. Coutre, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 743 (5th Cir. 1985) (but see
Armco Industrial Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 3 RICO L. Rptr. 547 (5th Cir. 1986), suggesting that "pattern" remains an open issue in the Fifth Circuit).
52 Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 3 RICO L. Rptr. 535
(1 1th Cir. 1986); Trak Microcomputer Corp. v. Wearne Bros., 3 RICO L. Rptr. 324 (N.D. II. 1985);
Kredietbank, N.V. v. Joyce Morris, Inc., 3 RICO L. Rptr. 280 (D.N.J. 1986).
53 U.S. v. Qaoud, 3 RICO L. Rptr. 250 (6th Cir. 1985).
54 Allington v. Carpenter, 619 F. Supp. 474, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 788 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Medallion
TV Enterprises, Inc. v. SelecTV of California, Inc., 3 RICO L. Rptr. 310 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
55 Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 3 RICO L. Rptr. 539 (8th Cir. 1986) (but see, Alexander Grant &
Co. v. Tiffany Industries, Inc., 770 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1985), stating in dicta that thirty related acts
of mail or wire fraud "bespeak a sufficient 'continuity plus relationship' " to satisfy the pattern requirement); Fleet Management Systems, Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 3 RICO L. Rptr. 386
(C.D. II. 1986); Fye v. First National Bank of Niles, No. 85 C. 0700 (N.D. II1. December 6, 1985);
Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 456 (N.D.
I1. 1985).
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noted, the post-Sedima "pattern" decisions tend to be "result-oriented",
often giving vent to judicial hostility to civil RICO.5 6 (Three of the proposed legislative amendments to RICO, H.R. 2517, H.R. 3985, and H.R.
4892, discussed infra, would clarify what must be proven to show a racketeering "pattern".)
A number of other procedural and substantive motions have been
effective in dismissing RICO claims. Because most RICO claims are
based on underlying mail, wire or securities fraud allegations, 57 the requirement that fraud be pleaded with particularity 58 has been litigated
extensively in civil RICO actions. Rule 9(b) is intended to ensure that a
defendant is sufficiently apprised of the allegations to fashion an answer
and that the complaint is not used as a pretext to conduct discovery. It
also seeks to protect a defendant from unfounded allegations of wrongdoing. 59 Some courts, emphasizing the gravity of a racketeering allegation,
have required that all predicate acts, not just those sounding in fraud,
must be pleaded with particularity, 60 or even that the civil complaint
meet a criminal "probable cause to indict" test. 61 A few courts have
required that each element of the RICO claim, not just fraud or the al62
leged predicate acts, be pleaded with particularity.
Courts are also modifying the received body of criminal law precedent regarding what must be alleged and proved to establish that the
defendant committed the underlying predicate acts of mail and wire
fraud. Some courts, including the Eighth Circuit, seem to be importing a
justifiable reliance element into statutory mail and wire fraud law in civil
56 Comment of Irvin B. Nathan, partner in the Washington, D.C. firm of Arnold & Porter, at
the conference, "Civil RICO: A Guide to Practice and Strategy", held in Washington, D.C. on June
19, 1986. Mr. Nathan served as Program Chairman of the conference.
57 Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section on Corporation, Banking
and Business Law (March 28, 1985).
-1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
59 See Bisceglie, "The Importance of Pleading Fraud With Particularity in Civil RICO Actions," 2 RICO L. Rptr. 20 (1985).
Given the liberal pleading policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 8's
requirement of merely "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief," courts are ordinarily reluctant to dismiss with prejudice on Rule 9(b) grounds. Typically,
Rule 9(b) is satisfied by alleging the time, place and general contents of the alleged misrepresentation, and the identity of each defendant. See, e.g., Mitchell Energy Corporation v. Martin, 616 F.
Supp. 924 (S.D. Tex. 1985); Onesti v. Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc., 3 RICO L. Rptr. 103
(N.D. Ill. 1985); but see, Seville Industrial Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp., 742
F.2d 786, 791, 1 RICO L. Rptr. 566 (3d Cir. 1984) (date, place and time of alleged fraud need not be
pleaded).
60 Allington v. Carpenter, 619 F. Supp. 474, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 788 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Bache
Halsey Stuart Shields v. Tracy Collins Bank, 558 F. Supp. 1042, 1046 (D. Utah 1983).
61 Bennett v. E.F. Hutton Co., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
62 Doxie v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 603 F. Supp. 624, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 141 (S.D. Ga. 1984);

Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
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RICO actions. 6 3 The federal mail fraud" and wire fraud 65 statutes require a scheme to defraud and use of the mails or wire in furtherance of
the scheme, but neither statute has been interpreted in criminal prosecutions to require proof of justifiable reliance, a common law tort
66
element.
A number of RICO cases have been dismissed for failing to name a
defendant who is different from the "enterprise" alleged. The great
weight of authority is that for actions alleging violations of § 1962(c), the
most often used subsection of RICO, the liable "person" must be distinct
from the "enterprise" whose affairs he or she allegedly was "employed by
or associated with."' 67 The effect of requiring a distinct "person" and
"enterprise" is to immunize the enterprise from liability-regardless
whether the corporation was the perpetrator or beneficiary of the racketeering activity on the one hand, or the mere instrument or victim on the
other. Courts reason that the language of § 1962(c), which applies to
"any person employed by or associated with" an "enterprise", suggests
that the "person" and "enterprise" are not one and the same. Such a
reading, these courts say, is consistent with Congress' intent to protect
enterprises from infiltration by organized crime elements. A number of
courts similarly require a distinct "person" and "enterprise" under the
other subsections of § 1962.68 Creative pleading of a distinct association63 C.M. Flowers v. Continental Grain Company, 775 F.2d 1051, 3 RICO L. Rptr. 70, 72 (8th
Cit. 1985); Hennessey v. Connecticut, 3 RICO L. Rptr. 420 (N.D. III. 1985); but see, Armco Industrial Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 3 RICO L. Rptr. 547 (5th Cir. 1986).
64 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
65 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
66 The criminal precedent has held that use of the mails or interstate wire must merely be reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954), and be closely
related to the fraudulent scheme. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974).
67 Bennett v. United States Trust Co. of New York, 770 F.2d 308, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 440 (2d Cir.
1985); B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628, 634, 1 RICO L. Rptr. 799 (3d Cir. 1984);
Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 400, 1 RICO L. Rptr. Appendix No. 3 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 95 (1985); United States v.
Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1061
(8th Cir. 1982), aff'd in pertinent part in banc, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W.
3440 (Dec. 5, 1983); Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984); but see, United States v.
Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983).
68 More analysis has focused on claims under subsection (a) than (b) or (d). Courts requiring
that the "person" and "enterprise" be distinct under § 1962(a) include: Rush v. Oppenheimer &
Co., Inc., 3 RICO L. Rptr. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Wilcox Development Co. v. First Interstate Bank
of Oregon, No. 81-1127-RE, I RICO L. Rptr. 513 (D. Or. 1984); Kredietbank, N.V.v. Joyce Morris, Inc., 3 RICO L. Rptr. 264 (D.N.J. 1985) but see, Masi v. Ford City Bank and Trust Co., 779
F.2d 397, 3 RICO L. Rptr. 248 (7th Cir. 1985); Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 3 RICO L.
Rptr. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Ark Travel, Inc. v. Travellers Inter. Tour Operators, Inc., 2 RICO L.
Rptr. 283, 291 (D.N.J. 1985); B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 2 RICO L. Rptr. 453 (D.N.J.
1985); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Derry Construction Co., Inc., 2 RICO L. Rptr. 762 (W.D.
Pa. 1985).
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in-fact enterprise or efforts to impute liability have met with mixed
results.

69

Some courts, focusing on the language in § 1962(c) that the "person" must "conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of such enterprise's affairs", have rejected claims under this subsection
absent an allegation or proof that the defendant played some role in the
' 70
management of the "enterprise" through a "pattern or racketeering."
(Emphasis added.) The required depth of participation in the enterprise
is a critical issue in RICO claims against outside professionals, especially
accountants and lawyers. As the Eighth Circuit wrote in dicta:
Mere participation in the predicate offenses listed in RICO, even
in conjunction with a RICO enterprise, may be insufficient, to support a RICO cause of action. A defendant's participation must be
in the conduct of the affairs of a RICO enterprise, which ordinarily will require some participation in the operation or manage71
ment of the enterprise itself.
Courts have also held that under § 1962(a), which prohibits the in69 Naming the corporate "deep pocket" as the liable "person" and the corporation and the actual wrongdoer as an association-in-fact "enterprise" has been rejected by some courts. Atkinson v.
Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 3 RICO L. Rptr. 451 (N.D. Tex. 1986); Tarasi v. Dravo Corporation,
2 RICO L. Rptr. 596, (W.D. Pa. 1985); but see, Nunes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 2 RICO L. Rptr. 304 (D. Md. 1985). A plaintiff might also reach a "deep pocket" under the
theory of respondeat superior, which holds a principal civilly liable for an agent's acts committed
within the scope of his or her employment and apparent authority. However, whether traditional
agency principles apply-given RICO's treble damage remedy, its quasi-criminal chracter and the
requirement of a distinct "person" and "enterprise" under § 1962-is itself a hotly contested litigation issue. Courts stating that respondeat superior does not apply under RICO include: Parnes v.
Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 24 n.9 (N.D. II. 1982); O'Brien v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 1 RICO L. Rptr. 153 (D. Ariz. 1984); Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 456 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Kredietbank, N.V. v. Joyce
Morris, Inc., 3 RICO L. Rptr. 264 (D.N.J. 1985); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 92,444 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1985); Intre Sport, Ltd. v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc.,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,439 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1985); but see, Fye v. First Nat'l Bank of
Niles, No. 85 C 700 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 1985); Wagman v. FSC Securities Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,445 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 1985); Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798, 811, 2 RICO L. Rptr.
162, 173, (D. Md. 1985); In re Olympia Brewing Company Securities Litigation, I RICO L. Rptr.
823, 837-38 (N.D. Il1. 1984); Bernstein v. IDT Corporation, 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1082-85, 1 RICO L.
Rptr. 159, 162-63 (D. Del. 1984).
70 John Peterson Motors, Inc. v. General Motors Corporation, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 500 (D. Minn.
1985); see also, United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, aff'd en banc, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979);
United States v. ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
71 Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1983). Most courts, however, do not require
such a central, management role in the enterprise, noting that liability attaches under § 1962(c) to
those who "participate,directly or indirectly" in the enterprise. (Emphasis supplied.) Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Savings Assn. v. Touche Ross & Co., 3 RICO L. Rptr. 535 (11 th Cir. 1986);
U.S. v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 57 (2d Cir.); U.S. v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1332 (5th Cir. 1983); Schact
v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1360 (7th Cir. 1983); Ahern v. Gaussoin, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 339 (D. Or.
1985); Virden v. Graphics One, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 768 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
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vestment of racketeering income in an enterprise, that a "RICO injury"
must result not from the racketeering acts but from the investment of the
racketeering income. 72 These courts reason that § 1964(c), the private
right of action, requires that the injury be "by reason of the violation of
section 1962," that is, by reason of the investment of the racketeering
income. This ruling functionally limits the universe of potential plaintiffs
under § 1962(a) to businesses injured by the infusion of racketeering in73
come into the coffers of a business competitor.
A number of courts require that an association-in-fact "enterprise"
have a purpose or structure beyond that which is necessary to commit
the pattern of racketeering. 74 These courts reason that were the "enterprise" element satisfied by alleging an entity which had no existence
other than an association to commit the predicate acts, the "enterprise"
and "pattern" elements would merge.
Because the civil RICO statute does not include a statute of limitations, RICO-hostile trial judges hold considerable discretion in selecting
a limitations period. Where an express limitation period is not provided
in a federal statute, courts typically "borrow" what they characterize as
the most analogous state law, as long as it is not inconsistent with federal
policy.7 5 As a result courts have applied a variety of limitations periods
in civil RICO actions, ranging from one to six years (two or three years
are most common), based on state law limitations periods for fraud; 76
79
78
general statutory limitations periods; 77 antitrust law; securities law;
72 Heritage Insurance Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 3 RICO L. Rptr. 574 (N.D. Il1. 1986);
Waldschmidt v. Crosa, 4 RICO L. Rptr. 202 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
73 A plausible, alternative interpretation is that § 1962(a) is concerned with money "laundering"; hence a violation is completed by the mere receipt and investment of the racketeering income.
B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 2 RICO L. Rptr. 453 (D.N.J. 1985). Even under this broad
interpretation, however, plaintiffs still face the difficult task of tracing and identifying the specific
racketeering income which was invested.
74 Seville Ind. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 1 RICO L. Rptr. 566, 569
n.5 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 222-23 (3d Cir. 1983) (enterprise
requires: (1) an ongoing organization with some sort of decision-making structure; (2) participants
function as a continuing unit; and (3) an existence beyond that necessary to commit the racketeering
acts); United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 664-65 (8th Cir. 1982) (enterprise must have "commonality of purpose," "continuity of... structure and personality and a structure "distinct from
that inherent in the conduct of a pattern of racketeering"; but see, United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d
85 (2d Cir. 1983) (no "distinctness" requirement); see also United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880 (5th
Cir. 1978).
75 See Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1942 & n.12 (1985).
76 Alexander v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 729 F.2d 576, 577 (8th Cir. 1984); Fustok v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1076, 1080-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Thomas J. Lipton, Inc. v. Osborn, I RICO L. Rptr. 998, 1000 (D.N.J. 1984); D'Iorio v. Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 232 (M.D.
Pa. 1982); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 683-85 (N.D. Ind.
1982).
7 See Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat'l Bank, 755 F.2d 239, 249 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 3530 (1985); Compton v. Ide, 732 P.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984); Teltronics
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0

injury to real or personal property; 81 and

82

residuary limitations period.
Where a contract provides for compulsory arbitration of a dispute
between the parties, a growing number of courts have held that a RICO
claim may be subject to a motion to compel arbitration. 83 There is little
doubt, based on securities8 4 and antitrust 8 5 precedent, that courts will
give effect to arbitration clauses in RICO claims arising out of international contract disputes. Even if a court concludes that the important
national interest in crime control renders a RICO claim non-arbitrable,
an arbitrator's findings on the underlying predicate acts may nevertheless
86
collaterally estop a RICO suit in federal court.
Finally, attorney's fees and costs may be assessed under Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure8 7 against parties or their counsel
Services, Inc. v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 724, 733 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd on other
grounds, 762 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1985); Seawell v. Miller Brewing Co., 576 F. Supp. 424, 427
(M.D.N.C. 1983).
78 See Ingram Corp. v. J Ray DeDermott & Co., 495 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 n.4 (E.D. La. 1980).
79 See Burns v. Ersek, 591 F. Supp. 837, 843-44 (D. Minn. 1984); see also, Clute v. Davenport
Co., 584 F. Supp. 1562, 1577 (D. Conn. 1984); Gilbert v. Bagley, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,483
(N.D.N.C. 1982).
80 See Electronic Relays (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Pascente, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 332, 333-38 (N.D. Ill.
1985); Caldarone v. Brown, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 58 (N.D. Il1. 1983).
st Middle States Knowlton Corp. v. Esic Capital, Inc., No. 82-1911, 3 RICO L. Rptr. 142, 145
(D.D.C. 1985).
82 See Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 162, 170 (D. Md. 1985); Victoria Oil
Co. v. Lancaster Corp., 587 F. Supp. 429, 431 (D. Colo. 1984).
83 Courts ordering RICO claims to arbitration include: Brener v. Becker Paribas Inc., No. 84
Civ. 5872 (CHT) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 1986); Stone & Associates v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.,
No. 85 C 6972 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 1985); Ross v. Mathis, 3 RICO L. Rptr. 126 (N.D. Ga. 1985);
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Chemtex Fibers Inc., 2 RICO L. Rptr. 758 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); West v. Drexel Burnahm Lambert, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 26, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 470 (W.D. Wash.
1985); Finn v. Davis, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 293 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Chapman v. Arthur Murray Int'l Inc.,
No. 82-2345 CIV-CA (S.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 1983); but see McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, 3
RICO L. Rptr. 848 (2d Cir. 1986); Weizman v. Adornato, 3 RICO L. Rptr. 441 (E.D.N.Y. 1985);
McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. 1985); Blumenthal v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 2 RICO L.
Rptr. 275 (1985); Witt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Fed. Sec. I Rep. (CCH)
91,970 (W.D. Pa. 1985); Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 510
(W.D. Pa. 1984); Universal Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Beacon Ins. Co., 588 F. Supp. 735 (W.D.N.C.
1984); Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 585 F. Supp. 23 (N.D. Cal. 1984); S.A. Mineracao Da TrindadeSamitri v. Utah Int'l Inc., 576 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The Fifth Circuit initially held RICO
claims to be non-arbitrable but has since modified its ruling and remanded the issue to the district
court for further consideration. Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 3 RICO L. Rptr., 693 (5th Cir. 1986), modified and remanded, 4 RICO L. Rptr. 131
(5th Cir. 1986).
84 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
83 Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth, 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
86 Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, 763 F.2d 1352, 1361-62, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 250 (11th

Cir. 1985); Gainesville v. Island Creek Coal Sales, RICO L. Rptr. 134 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 1984).
87 Rule 11, Fed. R. Civ. P., provides that:
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who interpose frivolous pleadings. A number of courts have already imposed sanctions against RICO plaintiffs88 and, given the hostility of

many judges to civil RICO, the imposition of sanctions will likely become a more common occurrence in RICO litigation.
Thus, the mere filing of a RICO claim has neither brought corporate
defendants to their knees nor proven to be an automatic bonanza for
plaintiffs. Nevertheless, business interests have turned their attention to
Capitol Hill in hopes of removing the treble damage RICO threat
altogether.
V.

CORPORATE LOBBY MOBILIZES FOR LEGISLATIVE RELIEF

Although only a handful of judgments has yet been awarded in civil
RICO suits, business interests-with some assistance from organized labor-have appealed to Congress for a substantial overhall of the RICO
statute. Among those who have testified before the Senate Judiciary
Committee and the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice are representatives of the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Securities Industry Association, the American
Bankers Association, the American Property and Casualty Insurance Industry, the American Council of Life Insurance and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Also participating in the antiRICO coalition, as junior partners, are the AFL-CIO and several of its
89
affiliated unions.

Every pleading... of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record in his individual name... The signature of an attorney... constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading...; that to his best knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation....
If a pleading ... is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its
own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both,
an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading
...
, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
88 Financial Federation, Inc. v. Ashkenazy, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
91,489 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (imposing $500,000 in sanctions, of which $150,000 was attributable to the
RICO claim); Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 2 RICO L. Rptr. 806 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Aetna Cas.
& Surety Co. v. Current Components, 2 RICO L. Rptr. 812 (E.D. Mo. 1985); but see, Fustok v.
Conticommodity Services, Inc., 2 RICO L. Rptr. 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Martinez, Inc. v. H. Landau
& Co., 3 RICO L. Rptr. 117 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Flaherty v. Torquato, 623 F. Supp. 55 (W.D. Pa.

1985).
89 Whereas business interests are most threatened by the inclusion of predicate acts sounding in
fraud, organized labor's opposition to RICO focuses on the inclusion of predicate acts for violating
29 U.S.C. §§ 186 and 501(c), which relate to payments and loans to labor organizations and the
embezzlement of union funds.
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"Establishment" interests are understandably disturbed by RICO's
enhanced remedies: They help to even the litigation contest between the
have-nots and the haves. Under the "American Rule," prevailing parties
pay their own litigation expenses. Attorney's fees and costs are subtracted from an actual damage award, often leaving a prevailing plaintiff
with a Pyrrhic victory. As a consequence, well-heeled institutions are
able to scare off less affluent claimants with the threat of a paper blizzard
and exorbitant litigation costs. RICO's triple damages and attorney's
fees restore the litigation balance, providing plaintiffs and their counsel
with the incentive to pursue claims against wealthy defendants.
RICO likely has encouraged suits against "Big Eight" accounting
firms in which plaintiffs have alleged that the defendants certified financial statements which they knew to be fraudulent. Plaintiffs allegedly
relied on the accountants' certifications, invested in or did business with
the accountants' clients and were injured as a result. 90 With the prospect
of recovering treble damages and attorney's fees, the "little guy" can seriously contemplate suit against accounting giants such as Price
Waterhouse and Touche Ross & Company.
Not surprisingly, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has been especially generous in funding the campaign to dull the civil RICO sword. Between the fourth quarter of 1983
and the fourth quarter of 1985, the AICPA spent $179,610 on lobbying
activities. 9' Although the amount devoted specifically to lobbying on
RICO cannot be determined from the AICPA's quarterly reports, the
relative frequency of RICO's mention in these reports suggests that a
substantial portion, perhaps most, of the AICPA's dollars went to RICO
lobbying. In particular the AICPA has not been niggardly in bestowing
campaign contributions on choice Members of Congress. The principal
beneficiary in the House of Representatives of the AICPA's Political Action Committee's (PAC) largesse for 1985-86 was Rep. Frederic Boucher
(D-Va.), the driving force behind the amendment to require a prior criminal conviction before a civil RICO suit may lie. The AICPA PAC contributed $3,000 directly to Boucher's campaign chest. 92 That, of course,
is only the tip of the CPA financial iceberg. It does not include contributions from individual CPA's who were inspired by favorable publicity
90 Among the CPA firms which have been sued under RICO are: Alexander Grant & Co.;
Arthur Andersen & Co.; Coopers & Lybrand; Ernst & Whinney; Laventhol & Horwath; Peat
Marwick Mitchell & Co.; Price Waterhouse; and Touche Ross & Co.
91 Included in Quarterly Reports filed with the Clerks of the House and Senate pursuant to the
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act.
92 A Political Action Committee is permitted to spend up to $5,000 per primary and $5,000 per

general election.
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and prompting from the AICPA to contribute to Rep. Boucher's
campaign.
The anti-RICO crusade has been able to inspire not only substantial
financial support, 93 but also some noteworthy personalities to carry its
torch in the Halls of Congress, including former Federal Communications Commission Chairman Newton N. Minnow, who was on retainer
with the "Big Eight" accounting firm of Arthur Anderson & Co.; 94 Se-

curities and Exchange Commissioner Charles L. Marinaccio, who reminded members of the Senate Judiciary Committee that Vice President
Bush's "Blue Ribbon" Task Group on Regulation of Financing Services
endorsed amending RICO to preclude its use in "nuisance" suits against
financial institutions; 95 and former Senator Roman Hruska (R-Neb.),
who is now an attorney in private practice in Nebraska representing
96
banks, securities dealers, insurers and large corporations.
The cries that RICO is having a ruinous effect on business recall
similar charges levelled against the antitrust and securities laws at their
birth. Leaders of the business community then claimed that passage of

'97
"will
the Clayton Antitrust Act "[would] wantonly harass business,"
be of disastrous consequence to the banks,1 98 will "demoralize ...business . . .in all lines," 99 and would result in "dangerous steps toward
paternalism, centralization, and socialism .....0oo
Instead, of course, the

Clayton Act
Magna Carta
Business
the Securities

has become, in the words of the Supreme Court, "the
of free enterprise."'' 0 1
interests and their hired legal guns also sought to disarm
Act of 1933, once the popular outrage over the collapse of

93 Among other Members of the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice to receive contributions from business groups lobbying against RICO is John Bryant (D-Tex.), who has received a total
of $2,200 since 1983 from the AICPA, the Securities Industry PAC, the American Insurance Association, the Alliance of American Insurers Federal PAC and Colt Industries, Inc.'s PAC. Subcommittee Chairman John Conyers (D-Mich.), who supports civil RICO, received nothing from any of
the above groups during the same time period. As for the Senate Judiciary Committee, Chairman

Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) has received $13,500 in combined contributions since 1983 from the
American Bankers Association, Colt Industries, the AICPA and the Alliance of American Insurers.
Campaign spending reports filed with the Federal Election Commission.

94 Hearingson civil RICO before the Subcommittee on CriminalJustice of the House Judiciary
Committee, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., July 24, 1985.
95 Hearingson civil RICO before the Senate Judiciary Commiittee, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., May 6,
1985.
96 Hearingson civil RICO before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., May 20,
1985.
97 Cong. Rec. 9406 (1914).
98 Id. at 9412.

99 Id. at 9183.
100 Id. at 14604.
101

United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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Wall Street had subsided. As soon-to-be Supreme Court Justice Felix
Frankfurther then noted:
The leading financial law firms who have been systematically carrying on a campaign against the Act have been seeking-now that
they and their financial clients have come out of the storm cellar of
fear-not to improve but to chloroform the Act. They evidently
assume that the public is unaware of the sources of the issues that
represent the baldest abuses of fiduciary responsibility and of the
lawyers who, to their fat profit, "passed" on those issues.102
One would be hard-pressed today to find even a single voice on Wall
Street to speak ill in public about the 1933 Securities Act. Nor, however,
would one easily find a single voice speaking kindly of RICO.
On Main Street, however, prosecutors and public interest groups
seeking effective enforcement measures against white collar crime have
mounted a counter-lobby in defense of civil RICO. They argue that
RICO provides an effective anti-fraud deterrent and remedy.
Crime committed by "legitimate" businesspersons and professionals
has reached staggering proportions.10 3 A Justice Department sponsored
study of 582 publicly owned corporations found that these businesses violated the law 1,554 during 1975 and 1976.1t 4 A 1982 study of major
corporations by US. News and World Report found that 115 corporations either had been convicted of at least one major crime or had incurred civil penalties for serious misconduct. 105
A study of bank failures during the 1980-81 period reveals that the
criminal activities of insiders were major factors in approximately onehalf of the bank failures and one-quarter of the savings and loan collapses. 106 Allegations are pending against nine of the ten largest defense
contractors for an array of fraudulent practices, including overcharges,
subcontractor kickbacks, product substitution, false claims, bid rigging
and bribery.

10 7

102 J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, p. 79 (1982).

103 The first systematic survey of corporate crime, E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME
(1949), found each of seventy major non-financial corporations studied had at least one substantial
law violation. Together, the seventy companies committed a total of 980 violations, an average of
fourteen per company. Violations included financial fraud and misrepresentation in advertising.
104 M. CLINNARD & P. YEAGER, ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1979).
105 Supra note 101.
106 Supra at 19.
107 Testimony submitted by National Association of Attorneys General and the National District
Attorneys Association to the Subcommittee on CriminalJustice of the House Judiciary Committee,
99th Cong., 1st Sess., October 9, 1985, page 16.
In all 45 defense contractors were under investigation, of which 36 were named in the New York
Times, June 22, 1985 at 25. The allegations were as follows:
1) McDonnell Douglas Corporation, cost mischarging.
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Medicaid provider and beneficiary fraud amounts to close to two
billion dollars a year. Medicare fraud totals another $1.5 billion. 0 8 Securities theft and fraud cost $8 billion.' 0 9 Commodities investment fraud
adds another $200 million. 1 0 Fraud in the sale of mobile homes costs
2) Rockwell International Corporation, cost and labor mischarging.
3) General Dynamics Corporation, cost mischarging, subcontractor kickbacks, labor
mischarging, product substitution, security compromise, defective pricing, cost duplication, false claims.
4) Lockheed Corporation, labor mischarging.
5) Boeing Company, cost mischarging, supply accountability, labor micharging.
6) General Electric Company, false claims, defective pricing, labor cost mischarging,
product substitution.
7) United Technologies Corporation, gratuities, subcontractor kickbacks, cost mischarging, bribery, defective pricing.
8) Raytheon Company, labor mischarging, product substitution.
9) Litton Industries, bribery and subcontractors kickbacks, labor mischarging, false
claims, bid-rigging, cost mischarging.
10) Grumman Corporation, cost mischarging.
11) Martin Marietta Corporation, subcontractor kickbacks, cost mischarging.
12) Westinghouse Electric Corporation, cost mischarging.
13) Sperry Corporation, labor mischarging, cost mischarging, defective pricing.
14) Honeywell, Inc., diversion of Government property, bid rigging.
15) Ford Motor Company, defective pricing, labor mischarging, falsification of performance records.
16) Eaton Corporation, conflict-of-interest gratuities, cost mischarging.
17) TRW, Inc., defective pricing, cost mischarging.
18) Texas Instruments, Inc., product substitution.
19) Northrop Corporation, labor mischarging, false progress payments.
20) Avco Corporation, subcontractor kickbacks, cost mischarging.
21) Textron, Inc., cost mischarging.
22) Allied Corporation, conflict of interest.
23) Tenneco, Inc., cost mischarging.
24) GTE Corporation, unauthorized acquisition and utilization of classified data, labor
micharging.
25) Sanders Associates, Inc., unauthorized release of contract information.
26) Motorola, Inc., labor mischarging.
27) Congoleum Corporation, mischarging, gratuities theft.
28) Harris Corporation, defective pricing.
29) Gould, Inc., cost mischarging.
30) Emerson Electric Company, cost mischarging, gratuities cost mischarging.
31) Johns Hopkins University, fraud of civilian health and medical program of the
uniformed services.
32) Tracor, Inc., product substitution.
33) Lear Siegler, Inc., product substitution.
34) Fairchild Industries, gratuities, product substitution, cost mischarging, false
statements.
35) Dynalectron Corporation, cost mischarging.
36) Todd Shipyard Corporation, noncompliance with contract.
108 Testimony submitted by National Association of Attorneys General and the National District
Attorneys Association to the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Committee
99th Cong., 1st Sess., Oct. 9, 1985 at 17.
109 Id. at 18.
"O ld. at 18.
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upwards of $100 million."' These figures just scratch the surface. A
1980 General Accounting Office study concluded that most fraud, even
that committed against the federal government with all of its investiga12
tory and prosecutorial resources, goes undetected and unpunished."
In his testimony before a House subcommittee, Russell Mokhiber,
representing the "Citizens Coalition to Support and Defend RICO,"
challenged the assumptions of those, like the Second Circuit in its
Sedima opinion, and Justice Marshall, who assert that a bright line separates "illegitimate" businesses, such as loan-sharking operations, from
"legitimate" businesses, such as brokerage houses.
Why did the Second Circuit assume that E.F. Hutton was a legitimate business? Because it was a corporation? Because it was a
large corporation employing thousands of citizens? Because it was
on Wall Street? Should we still refer to Hutton as a "legitimate"
guilty pleas and recent revelations of
corporation after its recent
3
its fraudulent behavior? 1
Whereas the average robbery nets approximately $338, the average
convicted white collar criminal nets roughtly $300,000. 114 Nevertheless,
the efforts and resources of public law enforcement agencies are directed
primarily at street crime, according to Ohio Attorney General Anthony
J. Celebreeze, Jr. Mr. Celebreeze, in defense of civil RICO, testified
before a House subcommittee that " [b]usiness crime is best fought by
those most familiar with it-the businessmen, employees and private
consumers who have been its victims.""11

5

Thus, the efficacy of RICO's

treble damages and attorney's fees as incentives to private enforcement
against business crime.
Steven J. Twist, the Chief Assistant Attorney General of Arizona,
put the case for civil RICO in stark terms to .the Senate Judiciary Committee: "RICO stands at the very center of this country's efforts to control criminal, organized fraud; it is the single best weapon yet developed
to ...

protect the integrity of our free market."'

16

Nevertheless, the "antis"-with their enormous financial resources
and battery of high-priced lawyers and lobbyists-have generally succeeded in defining the terms of the RICO legislation debate.
M Id. at

19.
Id. at 17.
113 Hearingson civil RICO before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary
Committee, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., October 29, 1985.
14 S. SHAPIRO, WAYWARD CAPITALISTS (1984).
"1 Hearingson civil RICO before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, House Judiciary Committee, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., October 9, 1985.
116 Hearings on civil RICO before the Senate JudiciaryCommittee, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., July 31,
1985.
112
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VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS
At this writing five amendments to RICO have been introduced,
four in the House and one in the Senate. 1 7 H.R. 2943,118 introduced in
1985 by Rep. Frederic Boucher (D-Va.), has the backing of most of the
business groups and the bi-partisan co-sponsorship of approximately 150
members of the House. H.R. 2943, as compared to the other proposed
amendments, has the virtue of simplicity. It would impose a "prior conviction" requirement before a defendant would be subject to suit under
civil RICO-the very standing requirement rejected by the Supreme
Court in Sedima. H.R. 2943 also includes a one year statute of limitations period.
Simplicity and good law are not synonymous, however. In Sedima,
Justice White pointed out that a prior conviction requirement would
pose numerous jurisprudential problems and contravene Congressional
intent:
Such a rule would severely handicap potential plaintiffs. A guilty
party may escape conviction for any number of reasons-not least
among them the possibility that the Government itself may choose
to pursue only civil remedies. Private attorney general provisions
such as § 1964(c) are in part designed to fill prosecutorial gaps.
Cf. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979). This purpose would largely be defeated, and the need for treble damages as
an incentive to litigate unjustified, if private suits could be maintained only against those already brought to justice." 19
The Court further pointed out that a prior conviction requirement encourages plea-bargaining to non-predicate offenses in order to immunize
the defendant against civil exposure to RICO; it "could lead to unhealthy
private pressures on prosecutors and to self-serving trial testimony, or at
least accusations thereof";120 and it would pose problems if convictions
were subsequently reversed.121 If enacted by Congress, a prior conviction requirement would also pose issues regarding retroactivity. Would,
for example, RICO claims already in court be affected?
117 Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) was expected to introduced a comprehensive amendment in
the Senate, generally reflecting the views of RICO supporters. At this writing, however, the bill had
not yet been introduced.
118H.R. 2943, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).

Sedima at 75.
When the prior conviction requirement was controlling law in the Second Circuit, one plaintiff successfully brought a mandamus action seeking to force the government to institute criminal
proceedings against the defendant. Plaintiff argued that the government was obligated to prosecute
so that plaintiff would not be automatically precluded from bringing a civil suit under RICO. In re
Grand Jury Application, No. - (S.D.N.Y. April 26, 1985).
"19
120

121

Sedima, at 73 n.9.
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Despite these problems, H.R. 2943 has been endorsed by the
AICPA, the Securities Industry Association, the American Property and
Casualty Insurance Industry, the American Council for Life Insurance,
the National Association of Manufacturers, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, the Paine Webber Group, the American Bankers Association, the New York Clearing House Association of twelve major New
York banks, the United States Chamber of Commerce, the AFL-CIO,
the United Auto Workers of America, the United Steelworkers of
America and the International Association of Machinists.
AICPA Chairman Ray Groves testified before the Senate Judiciary
Committee that a prior conviction requirement would "screen those people who may fairly be charged with real criminal activity [organized
crime families] from those who should not be subject to accusations of
racketeering."' 122 Absent such a screening criterion, Groves raised the
spectre that private plaintiffs' counsel, unconstrained by Department of
Justice guidelines limiting use of RICO by federal prosecutors, will include a civil RICO claim in nearly every run-of-the-mill business dispute.
Prosecutors, state agency officials and consumer group representatives, on the other hand, have all testified before Congress that a prior
conviction standing requirement would, in the words of Oregon Attorney
General David B. Frohmayer, "drastically curtail" the effectiveness of
RICO in controlling organized criminality.1 23 Philip A. Feigin, Chairman of National Association of Securities Administrators Association's
Enforcement Section Special Projects Committee, testified that the government lacks the resources to bring all the necessary actions; between
1977 and 1983, inquiries and complaints to the Securities and Exchange
Commission's Enforcement Division increased by 341 percent while Enforcement Division staffing actually dropped. 24 A private attorney, Jeffrey W. Herrmann, noted a Justice Department study finding that of the
22,585 civil and criminal cases filed under federal antitrust provisions
which also provide for treble damages, 84 percent were brought by private plaintiffs rather than the U.S. government.125 Another private attorney, Nicholas Gilman, offered a practical example of the effect of a
"prior conviction" requirement. Gilman represents, pro bono, Vietnam
veterans who are alleging a three million dollar scheme by four mobile
home manufacturers to defraud the veterans and Veterans Administration's Guaranteed Home Loan Program. The four manufacturers have
122 Hearings on civil RICO before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., July 31,
1985.
123 Hearings on civil RICO before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., August
31, 1985.
124 Id.
125

Id.

ANTIOCH LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:153

already pleaded guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which criminalizes making
false statements to the United States. However, since § 1001 is not
among the enumerated predicate acts in § 1961 of RICO, these prior
convictions would not satisfy the civil standing requirement proposed in
H.R. 2943.126 By contrast, as the statute is currently written, the veterans can state a RICO claim by alleging mail fraud offenses committed by
the manufacturers for which no convictions have been entered.
S. 1521,127 introduced by Sen. Orrin Hatch, is itself expected to be
amended to incorporate a "prior conviction requirement." As currently
written, S. 1521 would: (1) limit civil RICO plaintiffs to those persons
who suffer "competitive, investment, or other business injury as a result
of a violation of section 1962 . . ."; (2) require that at least one of the

predicate acts alleged be other than mail, wire or securities fraud; and
(3) allow for the award of attorney's fees to defendants if a court finds
that the RICO claim is "frivolous and without merit."
The rationale for the "competitive" or "business" injury requirement is that RICO was intended to protect legitimate business from
criminal infiltration; therefore, RICO should compensate only persons
suffering a business injury caused by a "pattern of racketeering." But as
New Mexico Attorney General Paul Bardacke warned in a written submission to the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, a "competitive"
or "business" injury requirement "would make the civil RICO statute a
statute only for businessmen and not for consumers."1 28 Limiting plaintiffs to private businesses and investors might also preclude civil suitsboth direct and parens patriae actions-by the federal and state
governments.
Including a provision for the award of attorney's fees to defendants
for frivolous claims would add nothing since Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, already allows for such a sanction without further statutory authorization. The rationale for requiring that the plaintiff
allege at least one predicate act other than fraud-known as the "fraudplus" requirement-is that this will ensure that some "real mobstertype" involvement is present, a requirement which the Supreme Court
rejected in Sedima. It would also go a long way toward immunizing the
business community against civil RICO liability, since most civil RICO
claims are founded on fraud.
126Hearings on civil RICO before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary
Committee, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., October 9, 1985.
127S.1521, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
128Hearings on civil RICO before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, House Judiciary Committee, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (written statement submitted on February 27, 1986).
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A "fraud-plus" requirement is also included in H.R. 2517.129 The

first of two amendments introduced by Rep. Conyers. His more recent
bill, H.R. 3985,130 does not include a "fraud-plus" requirement.

H.R. 2517 is directed primarily at RICO's criminal provisions but
would have a significant "spill-over" effect on the civil side. H.R. 2517
would: (1) require that each predicate act occur within five years of an
indictment. The current act allows the government or a private plaintiff
to allege predicate acts within ten years of the previous act; (2) delete the
RICO conspiracy provision, § 1962(d). Since conspiring to commit a
predicate act may itself be a predicate act, 1 3 ' deleting the conspiracy provision would avoid the anomalous situation of liability under § 1962(d)
for "conspiring to conspire"; (3) clarify that a natural person cannot constitute an "enterprise"; and 4) change the name of the statute to the
"Criminal Enterprises and Corruption of Enterprises Act" and delete all
references to the (arguably pejorative) term "racketeering activity."
The two pending bills preferred by the pro-RICO side are H.R.
3985132 and H.R. 4892.133 H.R. 3985 strengthens RICO's anti-fraud
provisions while it seeks to allay the business community's concern over
being charged with "racketeering." It removes from the "racketeering
activity" definitional section, § 1961(1), the predicate acts of mail and
wire fraud, and interstate transport of stolen property and it adds a new
subsection, § 1961(1 1), entitled "fraudulent activity." This new category
34
incorporates the current fraud predicates plus several additional ones.1
H.R. 3985 also differs from H.R. 2517 in how a "pattern of racketeering" activity is defined. H.R. 2517 requires that predicate acts occur
in transactions separate in time and place but which are interrelated by a
common scheme, plan or motive; by contrast, H.R. 3985 requires separate transactions but the predicate acts need not be related to one another
but only to the "enterprise." (Typically in civil RICO, where most
claims are founded on fraud, the necessary relatedness among the acts is
present. The broader language of H.R. 3985, however, allows a prosecutor to tackle wholly criminal conglomerates in which, for example, drug
129 H.R. 2517, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985).
130 H.R. 3985, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
131 United States v. Manzella, No. 85-3050, 3 RICO L. Rptr. 568 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1986); United
States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1123-24 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
132 H.R. 3985, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
1i3 H.R. 4892, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
134 Section 29 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. 79z-3; Section 325
of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. 77yyy; Section 49 of the Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a-48; Section 217 of the Investment Advisers Acts of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80b-17; and
Section 9 of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. 13.
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and gambling offenses may not be related to one another but are related
to the same criminal organization.)
H.R. 3985, like H.R. 2517, provides that a violation of § 1962 must
be a "knowing" one to be actionable under RICO. This is intended to
clarify that a mere negligent violation of § 1962 does not give rise to
liability. Since all RICO predicate acts are offenses requiring criminal
intent, adding a specific intent requirement could be viewed as surplusage. Nevertheless, addition of an express mens rea or scienter requirement could be interpreted as requiring that a defendant intend to commit
each element of a § 1962 violation, not simply the predicate acts. This
would also lend weight in litigation to defense arguments that respondeat
superiorliability cannot attach under RICO because actual, not imputed,
knowledge is required to violate § 1962.
H.R. 4892, introduced by Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.), adopts the
same broad "pattern" definition as in H.R. 3985. The "racketeering activity" section is expanded to incorporate a number of additional predicate acts beyond those included even in H.R. 3985.135 An express statute

of limitations period is fixed at four years. In addition, the Frank amendment would permit recovery not only for injuries to "business or property" but also for personal injuries (but not pain and suffering). Private
injunctive relief, without a showing of irreparable injury, would be made
expressly available, as would attorney's fees to a plaintiff who "substantially" prevails either through settlement or by the award of injunctive
relief. State attorneys general would be authorized to bring parens patriae suits under RICO.
Although H.R. 4892 generally expands civil RICO's reach, it offers
several concessions to business opponents of RICO. Most significantly,
H.R. 4892 makes private RICO claims expressly subject to agreements to
arbitrate, unless a "broad societal or public interest", or a contract of
adhesion is involved. Also, like H.R. 3985, H.R. 4892 moves fraudbased predicate acts to a separate, less stigmatizing, "fraudulent activity"
section. Finally, H.R. 4892, like S. 1521, provides for the award of attor135 Prostitution involving minors; under Title 18, chapter 51 (homicide); chapter 73 (obstruction
of justice); chapter 110 (sexual exploitation of children); section 32 (destruction of aircraft or aircraft
facilities; section 112 (relating to protection of foreign officials); section 115 (assaults against a federal official's family); section 215 (bank bribery); section 373 (solicitation to commit a crime of violence); section 510 (fraud on Treasury paper or other U.S. securities); section 511 (forgery of state
and other securities); section 566 (theft or bribery in benefit programs); section 844 (explosive materials); sections 1029 and 1039 (fraud in connection with access devices and computers); section 1203
(hostage taking); section 1344 (bank fraud); section 1952A (murder-for-hire); section 1952B (violent
crime in aid of racketeering); sections 2318 and 2320 (counterfeit materials); section 1029 (the Credit
Card Fraud Act of 1984); and any offense under the Controlled Substance Act of the Controlled
Substances Import and Export Act.
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ney's fees to defendants against whom frivolous or abusive suits have
been filed.
Other proposals have been advanced in Congressional hearings and
various articles to amend RICO which have not yet found their way into
a bill, including: adopting a "prior conviction requirement" but with exemptions for the federal government and perhaps state governments as
well; deleting mail and wire fraud as predicate acts in civil RICO altogether; eliminating treble damages; making treble damages discretionary
rather than mandatory; capping the amount of attorney's fees available
to a prevailing plaintiff; exempting the banking and securities industry
from treble damage RICO liability on the ground that these industries
are already subject to a pervasive scheme of federal regulation; assessing
trebled costs and attorney's fees against plaintiffs or their counsel who
bring frivolous RICO claims; defining "pattern of racketeering" as requiring not only at least two related acts but also a threat that more
racketeering acts will follow unless relief is granted; limiting the availability of respondeatsuperior under RICO; awarding attorney's fees to the
prevailing party, not only to a prevailing plaintiff; and repealing RICO's
liberal construction clause.
It is not clear just when Congress will take action on RICO. The
"antis" have several times thought that a vote on the "prior conviction
requirement" was imminent in the House Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, where a majority of the members are co-sponsors of the measure,
but thus far Chairman Conyers has deferred any action. The introduction of the Frank bill has at least temporarily slowed the anti-RICO coalition's momentum toward gaining passage of a prior conviction
requirement. Whether the "antis" ultimately will settle for less than a
full bottle will depend on whether the Frank bill in the House the expected Biden bill in the Senate significantly erode support for the "prior
conviction requirement."
VII. CONCLUSION

The small number of judgments for plaintiffs to date demonstrates
that a RICO claim, like any other, can be successfully defended on the
merits. Practically speaking, white collar RICO defendants enter litigation with significant advantages: the best and most expensive legal talent
available, substantial resources enabling extensive and expensive motions
practice, and a judiciary which is generally hostile to civil RICO. Therefore, RICO's treble damage and attorney's fees provisions simply help
restore the litigation balance, encouraging plaintiffs and their counsel to
pursue meritorious claims which would otherwise not be cost effective.
A 1985 CBS-New York Times poll revealed that 55 percent of the
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America people believe that most corporate executives are dishonest and
yet go unpunished.' 36 Slaps on the wrist for the likes of E.F. Hutton do
little to inspire public confidence that all, regardless of economic class,
are equal in the sight of the law. Instead, such selective enforcement
fosters public cynicism that ours is a two-tier system of justice, one for
the "haves" and another for the "have-nots".
Gutting civil RICO's encouragement of private attorneys general by
imposing a "prior conviction" or "fraud-plus" requirement, or eliminating the treble damages provision, would undermine enforcement efforts
against white collar crime and deprive injured parties of a valuable remedy. It would also further the popular suspicion that the rich and powerful-society's leaders and role models-are held to a lesser standard of
conduct than are average citizens. That is not the message Congress
should be sending to the American people.
As Judge George C. Pratt of the Second Circuit wrote in Furman v.
Cirrito, "[i]t seems almost too obvious to require statement, but fraud is
fraud, whether it is committed by a hit man for organized crime or by the
137
president of a Wall Street brokerage firm."'
136 Rothschild, No Place for Scruples, The Progressive, November 1985, at 28.
137 Furman v. Cirrito, I RICO L. Rptr. No. 2, C-1, C-6 (2d Cir. 1984), reversed on othergrounds,
53 U.S.L.W. 2063 (1985).

